The Tosefta Blog

Notes:

1. Mishna Peah 1:3 mentions an argument between the Tanna Kama, Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah about which parts of the field qualify as Peah. This Tosefta mentions the same argument with some additional clarifications.
2. The Tosefta says explicitly that when it says beginning, middle and end it is referring to the locations of produce inside the field. However the Beraita in the Sifra (Kedoshim 1) says the same law as our Tosefta without the word “field” in it. Based on the text in the Sifra, Saul Lieberman in his commentary Tosefta Kepshuta (on this Tosefta), claims that some Rishonim (medieval authorities) explain that it is referring to the time of the harvest (i.e. beginning of the harvest, middle of the harvest and end of the harvest) and not to the physical location of the produce in the field. See Rashi (Shabbat 23a, Lesof Sadehu) and Rabeinu Hillel (Sifra, Kedoshim 1, Daf 40a, Veein Peah Ela Lebesof). However it seems to me that that is not the intent of these Rishonim, but rather they learn the Sifra in the same manner as this Tosefta as I will explain further. From the Tosefta it is clear that that is not the meaning of this law and that it is referring to the location of the left produce in the field, because the Tosefta says the word “field”. In fact, most other Rishonim learn it to mean exactly that. See Rambam and Rash Mishantz on Mishna Peah 1:3. According to this explanation it is a little difficult to understand what is meant by “the beginning of the field”, since fields do not really have a beginning and an end, but rather the center and the edges. Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:3, Daf 6a) implies that these three locations are relative to where the person began harvesting his field and they do not refer to constant points in the field. So the beginning of the field means the place in the field where the person began harvesting the crops, the middle of the field refers to the spot where he has harvested half of the crops and the other half still remains, and the end of the field refers to the spot where the last of the crops have remained after the rest of the field has been already harvested. This explanation is preferred by Rash Sirillio in his commentary on the Yerushalmi. The Ralbag in his commentary on the Torah (Vayikra 19:9) explains this logic of the Yerushalmi as follows. He says that the Torah does not care where the person started and ended harvesting his field. He could have started harvesting it from a corner in a spiral circle and the last patch of produce that remained from the harvest ended up smack in the center of the field, which is the location of the field which is most difficult to access. Still the Torah prefers this last remaining produce to be Peah despite the difficulty of access to it. The Torah does not care how hard it is for the poor people to get to the left produce as long as they can get to it. All the Torah is concerned with is that the farmer leaves the last of his produce for the poor. The Torah did not want the farmer to feel that his top priority is taking care of the poor and not of himself; therefore he is only required to leave the last of his harvested produce and not the first of it. In fact Tosefta 1:7 points out four reasons why the Torah preferred that Peah should be left in end of the harvest path. Physical accessibility to the produce is not one of those reasons. Therefore Rashi and Rabeinu Hillel that are mentioned by Lieberman mention the beginning of the harvest not because they were talking about the time of the harvest season, but rather the location of the produce in the field where the farmer began harvesting it.
3. This first statement of the Tosefta teaches us that a person can give Peah in the same field in many different locations simultaneously. He can leave some Peah in the beginning of the field, where he began harvesting, then leave some more in the middle, after he harvested half of the field, and the leave some more in the end where he finished harvesting the field.
4. The second statement of the Tosefta clarifies that even if the person left Peah only in one location in the field he has fulfilled his obligation of giving Peah regardless where that locations happens to be and he does not have to give any additional produce in the end of the field. The Tanna Kama (the first anonymous opinion) holds that not only by Rabbinical law, but even by Torah law there is no specific location in the field where the person must leave Peah. Therefore regardless where he left Peah he has fulfilled his obligation both according to the Torah and according to the Rabbis.
5. See above Tosefta 1:1, note 8. Rebbi Shimon holds that the whole amount required by the Rabbis – 1/60^th of the produce of that field must be located in the end of the field and not in some other location.
6. Rebbi Shimon argues on the Tanna Kama and says that both by Torah law and by Rabbinical law he must give Peah in the end of the field (i.e. where he finished harvesting) and if he did not do so he did not fulfill the obligation of giving Peah. Therefore the whole amount required by the Rabbis must be located in the end of the field. However the person is allowed to add to the basic amount of Peah required by the Rabbis (1/60^th) additional crops. These additional crops can be located anywhere in the field, even in the beginning or in the middle relative to where he began harvesting, and they are considered to be Peah, as opposed to just Hefker – ownerless produce. The difference is that Peah can only be collected by the poor, where as ownerless produce can be taken by anyone, even the rich.
7. Rebbi Yehudah’s opinion is in between the Tanna Kama’s and Rebbi Shimon’s. Rebbi Yehudah holds that by Torah law the person must leave Peah in the end of the field (i.e. where he finished harvesting), however that applies only to the minimum amount required by the Torah, which is a single stock. The rest of it up to 1/60^th is only required Rabbinically and the Rabbis did not require Peah to be left in the end of the field, but rather anywhere in the field. Therefore as long as the farmer left one stock in the end of the field he has fulfilled the Torah obligation and now he can leave the rest of it up to 1/60^th in any location. However if he did not leave anything in the end of the field then he did not fulfill his Torah obligation of giving Peah and it is impossible to fulfill the Rabbinical obligation without fulfilling the Torah obligation first. Therefore none of the produce left counts as Peah, but rather as ownerless produce, which can be taken by either poor or rich. Obviously if the person wants to leave additional produce beyond 1/60^th for Peah he can do so and it will also be considered to be Peah and not just ownerless produce, but only as long as the minimum requirements of Torah and Rabbinical law have been fulfilled.
8. It should be noted that there are other explanations of the argument between the Tanna Kama, Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah. For example, see the commentary of Rash Mishantz on the Mishna (Mishna Peah 1:3). I have explained their argument in a way which fits best into the language of the Tosefta.

Well I never thought it would have to come to this, but it turned out to be really expensive. Many people have requested that I add vowels (nikkudot) to the Hebrew text of the Tosefta. The problem is that I am not an expert at that and I have to hire a professional to do that. The job for Berachot will cost $500 and for every Masechta of roughly the same size after that as well. If you would like to see the nikkud happen I have to ask for your donations. Otherwise I will simply leave it as it is. The money will be strictly used for the expenses of the project. I do not take any personal gain in this.

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Notes:

1. The Tosefta continues on a similar subject as the previous Tosefta. It is not related to any Mishna.
2. The Hebrew word צרף has two different meanings. It can mean to “smelt metal” or it can mean to “combine”. In the original statement of the Tosefta it makes more sense to translate it to smelt, because the Tosefta means to say that even though the person only had a thought God will make sure that it will become a real deed in the future. However in the final statement of the Tosefta not only changed the intent of the statement, but also the meaning of the word, which now means to combine, meaning that God counts a thought is if it was an action, even though in reality it was never implemented.
3. The verse in Tehillim is taken literally in this case, that if King David would have thought to do something evil God would not have listened to his plea.
4. The verse in Yirmiyahu is taken somewhat out of context since in the end of the verse which is omitted in the Tosefta God specifically addresses the Jewish people who He says performed evil deeds. However the Tosefta interprets this verse to be talking about people’s thoughts in general and about a particular people. It seems to me that the Tosefta’s question is really a philosophical question and this verse is simply brought as an Asmachta (reference). The question that bothers the Tosefta is that from the initial statement it would seem that whenever people have evil thoughts those thoughts should never become a reality, because God would make sure that it does not happen. However in the real world we see that people commit evil deeds all the time and clearly God does not prevent them from doing so, in which case the Tosefta’s original statement is simply not true.
5. Due to this philosophical problem the Tosefta changes its statement. Now it means to say that when a person has a good thought even if the person has never implemented it into a good deed God counts it as if he did and will reward the person accordingly. However if a person had an evil thought, but he never implemented it into an evil deed, then God simply ignores it and does not punish him for it. Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:1, Daf 5a) interprets the Tosefta’s final intent in this manner. The wording of the Tosefta’s last statement that I have quoted above is from the Erfurt manuscript. However in the Vienna manuscript it is different. There the Tosefta says as following:
   

   But rather, [it should be stated as follows:] a thought that has fruit is combined by God with an action and a [thought] that does not have fruit is not combined by God with an action.

   אלא מחשבה שעושה פירות המקום מצרפה עם המעשה מחשבה שאינה עושה פירות אין המקום מצרפה עם המעשה

   Talmud Bavli (Kiddushin 40a) quotes this Tosefta, and although in the printed version of the Gemara the text reads as in the Erfurt manuscript, the Munchen manuscript of Talmud Bavli and  Rashi (Kiddushin 40a, Machshava Sheosah Peirot, Metzarfah Lemaaseh) have the same reading in the Gemara as in the Vienna manuscript of this Tosefta. Rashi interprets it to mean that if a person took his thought and implemented it into a deed then God counts the thought on the same level as the deed and therefore if the thought and the deed were good then the person gets double the reward and if the thought and the deed were evil then the person gets double the punishment. However if the person never implemented his thought into a deed then God does not reward him at all if it was good and does not punish him at all if it was evil. I personally prefer the reading in the Tosefta according to the Erfurt manuscript since it flows better in the context from the Tosefta’s original statement.

Notes:

1. The Tosefta continues on a similar subject as the previous Tosefta. It is not related to any Mishna.
2. Most commentators on the Tosefta think that fruit and principal are references to this world and the Afterlife. However they argue which one refers to which, because it is not clear from the context. For various opinions see Tosefta Kepshuta and Higayon Aryeh. However, I have chosen not to explain it that way. I think that it is referring to immediate benefit and future benefit in this world for the person who performed the good deed. If a person helps someone at the least it makes him feel good right away, which is an immediate benefit. And the person whom he helped today may help him in return tomorrow, which would be a future benefit.
3. The verse is taken literally in this case. The verse says that it is good for the righteous in the present tense, referring to immediate befit, and then it says in the future tense that the righteous will eat the fruit of their deeds, referring to future benefit.
4. On a similar note a person who commits a bad act causes damage to himself by committing it. The damage can be emotional that a person feels bad about what he did, or it could be physical that he may be searched for by others for committing his crime. However, as long as he does not get caught, his transgression will not cause him anymore grief in the future in this world. Obviously in the Afterlife God will punish him, but as I already mentioned above in note 2, this Tosefta is not talking about Afterlife.
5. This verse as well is interpreted literally as the previous verse. It says that it is bad for the evil person in the present tense, meaning that he causes immediate damage to himself by performing the transgression. However the second half of the verse seems to be in contradiction with the Tosefta’s explanation. It says that an evil person will reap the product of his hands, meaning that he will get punished in the future (i.e. his evil deed will cause him future damage). However the Tosefta says that a transgression does not have fruit, which is not what the verse implies.
6. The verse in Mishlei clearly says that evil people will reap their own fruit, meaning that they will get future damage. So it is in contradiction with the Tosefta’s previous statement that evil deeds do not have fruit. The question is very puzzling to me, since the previous verse from Yeshayahu said the same thing, although the Tosefta chose to ignore that.
7. The Tosefta resolves the question by clarifying that transgressions that have future consequences cause future damage where is transgressions that do not have future consequences do not cause future damage. A good example of this may be if a man cheated on his wife with another married woman. His act has major future consequences, because it will probably result in divorce, a custody battle over children and possibly a ruination of his mistress’ family as well. However, if a person steals a candy bar from a supermarket, as long as he does not get caught most probably nothing will neither happen to him nor to the supermarket. As I already explained, since the Tosefta is not talking about punishment from God the question of why bad things happen to good people and good things to bad people does not come into play here. All the Tosefta is talking about is natural consequences of a person’s actions.

Notes:

1. Mishna Peah 1:1 listed three good things that a person can do in this world for which he receives physical benefit during his lifetime and in addition great reward in the Afterlife. The Mishna added that the reward for learning Torah is equivalent to the other three good things combined. This Tosefta states a similar list, but of evil deeds that a person can do for which cause great damage to his life in this world and will ensure great punishment in the World to Come.
2. “They” in this case does not refer to anyone in particular, not even to God. It is used as “the big they”.
3. The Hebrew word פרע means to collect debts or interest. In this case it means that the person causes damage to his own life by performing these evil deeds and causes his own ruin.
4. Illicit relations refer to any type of forbidden sexual relations, such as incest, bestiality and homosexual intercourse, but most commonly it refers to sleeping with another person’s spouse.
5. Obviously the Tosefta uses the juxtaposition of gossip opposite the three most severe sins in Judaism, in the case of which a person if forced to do them by someone else must chose to be killed instead (see Talmud Bavli Sanhedrin 74a), in order to emphasize the severity of gossip. It does not literally mean that gossip is so evil that a person must chose to be killed if he is forced by another person to speak gossip about someone.

Notes:

1. Mishna Peah 1:1 lists five things that do not have a fixed measure by Torah law. This Tosefta repeats that list and adds some details regarding the fixed measure of Peah.
2. Meaning that according to the Torah a person can do as little as he wants or as much as he wants of these things, as long as he does them.
3. The Torah commands that a person must leave the corners of his field not harvested so that the poor can collect the produce from them instead. See Vayikra 19:9 and 23:22. However the Torah does not specify how much produce should be left on each corner. It is up to the discretion of every field owner to decide how much to leave. As the Tosefta comments further, the Rabbis have proscribed a minimum amount for Peah.
4. The Torah commands that a person must bring as a gift to God the first fruits of the harvest from his fields. See Shemot 23:19 and Devarim 26:1-11. This commandment applies to the seven fruits for which the Land of Israel is blessed: wheat, barley, grapes, figs, dates and pomegranates. See Mishna Bikkurim 1:3. The first ripened fruits were gathered right before the holiday of Shavuot and brought to the Bet Hamikdash (the Temple) on Shavuot where a procedure of waiving was done with them, although technically they could be brought all the way until Sukkot. See Mishna Bikkurim 1:10. The Torah does not prescribe how many fruits of each kind had to be brought. By Torah law the person could bring as few as one of each kind or as many as he wanted to. However the Rabbis have proscribed for the Bikkurim a minimum amount of 1/60^th of the total produce of each type of fruit. See Talmud Yerushalmi (Bikkurim 3:1, Daf 10b).
5. The Torah commands that all Jewish men had to appear in the Bet Hamikdash three times a year on the pilgrimage holidays of Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot and bring some kind of a gift to God. See Devarim 16:16-17. The “gift” consisted of two sacrifices, called Olat Reiyah – The Fiery Offering of Showing Up, and Shalmei Chagigah – The Peace Offerings of Celebration. See Tosefta Chagigah 1:6. According to the Torah law the person could walk into the courtyard of the Bet Hamikdash even for one second and fulfill his obligation of showing up. Also he could bring as little or as many of these sacrifices as he wanted to and pay for them as little as he wanted to or as much as he wanted to. However the Rabbis have proscribed for them a minimum amount of money that a person should spend on each type of sacrifice. See Mishna Chagigah 1:2 for various opinions on these values.
6. There is no explicit commandment in the Torah to perform deeds of loving kindness. However the Torah implies such a commandment by general statements or by giving other specific commandments which in themselves are deeds of loving kindness. For example, the Torah commands that you should love another Jew as yourself. See Vayikra 19:18. This implies that a person is obligated to perform various deeds of kindness to others in the same way he would like others to perform similar deeds towards himself. Also, the Torah commands to give charity and help the poor, which is a deed of loving kindness. See Devarim 15:11. Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:1, Daf 2b) clarifies that although for deeds of loving kindness that a person does with his body, such as visiting the sick, the Rabbis have not proscribed a minimum amount, for charity since it is performed with money the Rabbis proscribed a minimum and a maximum amount. The minimum being either 1/100^th (like Terumat Maaser) or 1/50^th (like Terumah Gedolah) of the person’s wealth and the maximum being 1/5^th of his wealth.
7. The main commandment of studying Torah is not written in the Torah itself, but rather in the book of Yehoshua (1:8) where God commands Yehoshua to study Torah day and night. The Rabbis have always treated this commandment as a Torah obligation although it is not written in the Torah itself. The Torah did not prescribe how much Torah should a person study per day or even if it should be studied every single day. God’s commandment to Yehoshua of studying it day and night is not to be taken literally. It simply means that people should study the Torah a lot. However the Rabbis in ancient times already have set minimum amounts for Torah study. Either Moshe himself or Ezra instituted that the Torah should be publicly read every three days, on Mondays, Thursday, and on Shabbat. See Talmud Bavli (Bava Kama 82a).
8. Mishna Peah 1:2 specifies that the Rabbis have instituted the minimum amount for Peah to be 1/60^th of the person’s field, unless his field is really small in which case 1/60^th would be a useless amount, so he should add to it accordingly so it would be useful for the poor to take. There is no specification how much produce should be allocated in each specific corner of the field. Rather the four corners together should add up to 1/60^th.
9. The Tosefta clarifies that even though a person can leave as much produce as he wants for Peah he cannot designate his whole field to be Peah without harvesting anything. The reason is explained by Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:1, Daf 1a) that a person is only obligated to give Peah after he begins harvesting his field, since the Torah explicitly says (Vayikra 23:22) that Peah should be given during the harvest. Therefore if he did not harvest anything from his field, not even one stock, then the obligation of Peah did not start. Therefore he must harvest at least one stock from his field in order to make the rest of it Peah. It should be noted that Talmud Bavli (Nedarim 6b) quotes a different Beraita that seems to be arguing on this Tosefta and says that a person can designate his whole field to be Peah, based on a different derivation from a verse in the Torah.

I just posted the last chapter of Masechta Berachot on the English Translation page. Masechta Berachot has been completed. I am very excited about this great achievement. I will be going back to edit Masechta Berachot and to prepare it for publication in print. Meanwhile stay tuned for upcoming posts of Tosefta Peah.

Notes:

1. The Tosefta concludes tractate Berachot on a positive note praising the Jewish people’s performance of Mitzvot. Since both statements mentioned in this Tosefta were said by Rebbi Meir it made sense to place it here since the previous Tosefta ended with a  statement of Rebbi Meir. It is not related to any Mishna.
2. It is not clear if Rebbi Meir meant the count of one hundered literally or he just meant it as an exaggeration meaning “a lot of” commandments. It seems to me that he meant it as an exaggeration since he continued to list only a few of them.
3. By commandments he meant both Torah and Rabbinical obligations since in the list of his examples he mentioned Berachot and Shmoneh Esreh all of which are Rabbinical obligations.
4. Shema, Shemoneh Esreh and Berachot before and after eating bread have been described in earlier chapters in the Tosefta Berachot.
5. It is not clear which commandments that require Berachot before them Rebbi Meir is referring to since there are no other such commandments that a person does every single day besides the ones already mentioned by him.
6. For the description of the commandment of Tefillin see above Tosefta 6:15, note 10. It is clear from this Tosefta that the Tefillin on the arm is regarded as a separate commandment in the Torah from the Tefillin on the head. In fact, the Rambam counts them as two separate commandments in his Sefer Hamitzvot (Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh, 12 and 13).
7. For the description of the Mezuzah see above Tosefta 2:6, note 4.
8. For the description of Tzitzit see above Tosefta 6:15, note 6. Nowadays, the accepted opinion is that the garment with four Tzitzit on it is considered to be a single commandment as stated by the Tana Kama in the Mishna (Menachot 3:7) and therefore if one of the fringes rips the garment cannot be worn anymore until a new fringe is tied on. However the Mishna (ibid.) does quote the opinion of Rebbi Yishmael who says that each fringe of Tztitzit is considered to be a separate commandment, therefore the frour fringes together make up four commandments. Apparently Rebbi Meir agrees with the opinion of Rebbi Yishmael. Talmud Bavli (Menachot 37b) mentions the opinion of a few Amorayim who held that the law followed the opinion of Rebbi Yishmael and therefore it was permissible to wear a four cornered garment with just one, two or three Tzitzit on it, since each of them was a separate commandment.
9. The verse is interpreted somewhat out of context since King David was talking about saying praises to God seven times per day and was not referring to performnac eof commandments.
10. Since in the bath house he had to take all of his clothes off. The Tosefta could have given the example of going to the bath room as well.
11. This verse is taken out of context again, since the word Sheminit in the verse means an eight string harp which was a musical instrument. However the Tosefta interprets the word eigth to refer to the commandment of Brit Milah (circumcision) since it would be the eight commandment on the above mentioned list of commandments that surround a person every day and also it is a Mitzvah that is performed on the eigth day after the birth of the child.
12. This verse seems to refer to all commandments that a person performs and not just to circumcision, meaning that God sends His angel to protect those people who perform His commandments (i.e. those who fear Him).

Notes:

1. Mishna 9:5 says that when the heretics became very virulent the Rabbis have enacted that when people greet each other they should do it using God’s name. For example, instead of just saying “Hello” they should “May God bless you.” To prove that is allowed by the Torah and it is not a violation of the prohibition of saying God’s name in vain (see Shemot 20:7) the Mishna cites four different verses in the Tanach where either great people have greeted each other using God’s name or the verse simply teaches that in times when the Torah is not being followed then drastuic measures should be taken, therefore allowing such use of God’s name even though normally it would be prohibited. The heretics that the Mishna is referring to are probably a sect of the Escenes who did not say God’s name at all even in context that was permissible. See above Tosefta 6:26, note 8. This Tosefta uses the same four verses that the Mishna quoted but to prove a different behavior of the Rabbis than what the Mishna said.
2. This statement of the Tosefta is very difficult to translate and explain, because it does not seem to flow very well with the verses quoted. In my translation I have followed the explanation of Shaul Lieberman in his commentary Tosefta Kepshuta, because it seems to me the most logical and well fitting into the words of the Tosefta. However there is a variety of other explanations proposed by various commentators. For a good summary of various explanations and their refutations see Higayon Aryeh on this Tosefta.

This Tosefta cites the behavior of the Rabbis in ancient times that when the Jewish people would not study the Torah and follow it very much the Rabbis would stop teaching it to them publicly in great detail, but rather would only mention to them slight hints to remind them of the Torah in general. However, they Rabbis would continue studying it among themselves to make sure that it would remain preserved through out the generations. And when the people would revert and decide to study and follow the Torah again, then the Rabbis would begin teaching it publicly again. The next Tosefta will cite a similar opinion of Hillel the Elder who advised teaching the Torah when the people were following it and taking in its teachings, and not to publicly teach it when the people were not willing to keep it or to listen to its teachings. Meanwhile this Tosefta defends the policy of ancient Rabbis by citing four verses to prove it.

3. Allthough the book of Rut does not imply in any way that Boaz was a judge or a leader of the Jewish people or that the Jewish people during that time were not generally keeping and studying the Torah, the Rabbis followed a tradition that Boaz was a judge of the Jewish people and is the same person as the judge Ivtzan mentioned in the book of Shoftim (see Talmud Bavli Bava Batra 91a) and during his time (approximately 1000 BCE) the Torah was generally forsaken (see Midrash Rabbah Rut 1). The verse shows that when Boaz greeted the farmers he used God’s name and they responded to him in kind. The Tosefta implies from this that that was the extent of Boaz’s teaching of Torah to the people, that ge greeted them using God’s name and reminded them of God, but he did not teach them any more details.
4. The second verse is a statement made by the angel who visited Gideon and also greeted him using God’s name. The book of Shoftim explicitly says (Shoftim 6:7) that during Gideon’s time the Jews worshiped idols which is why God allowed other nations to oppress them. The Rabbis during that time apparently followed the same policy of not teaching the Torah to the people since they were not following it, so when the angel greeted Gideon he used God’s name as a hint to remind him of God, and as can be seen from Gideon’s response (Shoftim 6:13) that was a radical statement since Gideon started telling the angel that God is not with any of them since he has forsaken them and allowed other nations to oppress them. The Tosefta uses this verse in the same manner as the previous verse to imply that mentioning of God’s name in a greeting was the extent to which the leaders of the Jews would remind them of the Torah during that time.
5. The 3^rd verse from Mishlei is being used here as a direct defense of the ancient Rabbis’ policy. The mother in the verse is a reference to the Torah. So when the mother has grown old, meaning that the Torah has been forsaken, she should not be scorned, meaning that the Torah should not be taught to the masses, because all they are going to do is make fun of it anyway.
6. The last verse is also being used as a direct defense ifthe ancient Rabbis’ policy. This verse is used in general by the Rabbis to teach that at certain times when the Torah is especially forsaken by the people it is permissible to violate the commandments of the Torah in order to defend God. See Talmud Bavli (Berachot 63a) and Rashi (Berachot 63a, Misefei Lereshei). The most famous case of this is the story of Eliyahu the prophet who built an altar on the mountain of Carmel during the time of the first Bet Hamikdash, when it was forbidden to build altars outside of the Temple, in order to prove to everybody that Hashem is the real God. See Melachim I 18:19 – 18:46. So the Tosefta uses this verse in a similar manner that since the Jews have forsaken the Torah and are not following it or learning it, it would be permissible not to teach it to them, despite the fact that the Torah itself either directly commands (Devarim 6:7, 11:19, 17:9-11) or implies (for example see Devarim 32:7 and 33:4) that it should be taught to others.

Notes:

1. The Tosefta continues on the subject mentioned in the previous Tosefta. It also mentions the opinion of Rebbi Meir which is the same as the opinion of Rebbi Natan in Mishna 9:5.
2. This statement of Hillel the Elder is vague enough that it can be interpreted in many different ways. The Tosefta continues with an interpretation that goes together with the policy of ancient Rabbis as was mentioned in the previous Tosefta. However, other interpretations are possible. The most obvious interpretation is proposed by Rashi (Berachot 63a) that Hillel is teaching us that when other people do not teach the Torah to others (i.e. they gather in) you should take their place and teach it (i.e. spread its words), but when other great people are already teaching it (i.e. spread its words) then you should not run and teach it, because that may look arrogant and may belittle those people who are already teaching it. It should be noted that in Talmud Yerushalmi (Berachot 9:5, Daf 68a) the interpretation provided by this Tosefta is also attributed to Hillel the Elder, but as a separate statement and not as an interpretation of his original statement.
3. The verse in Mishlei does not really have a specific context, so it is open to various interpretations. Rashi and Ibn Ezra interpret it to be talking about giving charity, that a person who gives a lot of money to charity will eventually get more money, but a person who gives a little thinking that eh will save that way more money for himself in the end will lose it anyway. The Ralbag interprets it to be talking about spreading knowledge that a person who teaches others will become even wiser than he was, and a person who keeps his knowledge to himself will eventually lose even what he knows. The Tosefta seems to be following Ralbag’s interpretation however it is not clear from the verse what it has to do with the Torah being beloved by the people, since the verse seems to imply that a person should always spread his knowledge to others, regardless whether it is beloved to them or not.
4. In other words, you should protect God’s honor and make sure that the people do not make fun of the Torah and of God since they are not interested in them, and therefore not teach it to others.
5. Rebbi Meir argues on the interpretation of the Tosefta of Hillel’s statement and says that if the people have forsaken the Torah then it is absolutely critical that the Rabbis teach it to them and educate them so that the masses will go back to properly observing it.  Rebbi Meir’s statement only appears in the Erfurt manuscript and not in the Vienna manuscript, however I would like to point out that it is absolutely cirtical to the flow of the Tosefta and without it the wording of the previous Tosefta does not make sense. The previous Tosefta began with the word “originally” implying that that is the way it used to be in the early days of the Tanach, however later it was changed. Since according to this Tosefta, Hillel the Elder (approximately 110 BCE – 10 CE), followed the same policy as in the days of the Judges, there is no reason for the previous Tosefta to say the word “originally” since nothing has changed in a thousand years. However once it quotes Rebbi Meir’s opinion who argues on that interpretation the conclusion is that the policy has been changed in the days of Rebbi Meir (end of the 1^st century CE – beginning of the second century CE). Rebbi Meir’s opinion was so strong about education to the masses that he said (Talmud Bavli Sanhedrin 99a) that a person who studies Torah but does not teach it to others disgraces God himself. He said this as a general statement and did not specify that it only applies when the people follow the Torah anyway.

It should be noted that the prevalent opinion among educators and economists today is that ignorance causes various problems in society, such as crime and poverty. Therefore it is incumbent upon governments and educators to provide as much education to the masses as possible to keep the crime down and the standard of living high, even if the masses may not necessarily be interested in receiving the education. Society today clearly follows the opinion of Rebbi Meir. I would like to suggest that it is possible that the reason Rebbi Meir changed his opinion about the education system from the more prevalent opinion of Hillel the Elder and those that came before him due to the influence of Greek philosophers, especially Plato, who taught in his longest dialogue, The Laws, that education for the masses is crucial to society and should be championed by the state. For a detailed analysis of Plato’s theory of education see Rupert Clendon Lodge, “Plato’s Theory of Education”, Routledge, 2000. One may ask why did it take a few hundred years for the Greeks to influence the Jews in terms of compulsory education, since Plato died in 347 BCE, over 300 years before Hillel the Elder who apparently was still not influenced by his teachings? And what has changed in the time of Rebbi Meir, who flourished right after the destruction of the second Bet Hamikdash, roughly 60 years after Hillel’s death? There is simply not enough information to answer these questions. However, it should be noted that there are two events recorded in the Talmudic literature that imply that compulsory Torah education for children was introduced for the first time only during the reign of the Hasmonean king, Alexander Jannaeus (103-76 BCE) by the Nassi (president) of the Sanhedrin (Jewish Supreme Court), Shimon Ben Shetach (see Talmud Yerushalmi Ketubot 8:11, Daf 50b), and that Torah schools for children have not been established in all towns and villages of Israel until the time of the High Priest, Yehoshua Ben Gamla (63-65 CE) as a result of the war with the Romans and danger of interruption in the transmission of the Torah (see Talmud Bavli Bava Batra 21a). From both of these stories it can be deduced that compulsory Jewish education has not been established in Judea until the end of the Second Temple period, which took place during the lifetime of Rebbi Meir. Clearly Rebbi Meir was pushed to change his mind from the precedent opinion of Hillel due to the tumultuous events of the Jewish War which put the transmission of the Torah in jeopardy. For a detailed analysis of Jewish education in ancient Palestine see John Joseph Collin, “Jewish wisdom in the Hellenistic age”, Westminster John Knox Press, 1997, p. 35-36.

I just posted the audio shiur on Peah chapter 2 on the Audio Shiurim page.