Archives for October 2009

Tractate Peah, Chapter 1 Tosefta 51 A person gives Peah (corners of the field) from the beginning of the field,2 and in the middle [of the field], and in the end [of the field].3 But if he gave either [only] in the beginning [of the field], or [only] in the middle [of the field], or [only] in the end [of the field], he has fulfilled his obligation [of giving Peah to the poor].4 Rebbi Shimon says, “If he gave either [only] in the beginning [of the field], or [only] in the middle [of the field], or [only] in the end [of the field] it is considered to be Peah, but he [still] needs to give the proper amount5 [of Peah] in the end [of the field].”6 Rebbi Yehudah says, “If he left [at least] one stalk [in the end of the field,] he can add to it [from other parts of the field to make up the minimum amount and] it counts for him as Peah. But if [he did] not [leave even one stalk at the end of the field] he only gives [what he left in the beginning and the middle of the field [to the poor] as ownerless [produce, but not as Peah].” Rebbi Yehudah said, “When do we say this [that he can add the produce in the end of the field to the produce left in other parts of the field and all of it counts as Peah]? At the time that he [actually] gave Peah [by leaving at least one stock in the end of the field] and then he wants to add [to it more produce from other parts of the field].”7, 8

מסכת פאה פרק א תוספתא ה נותן אדם פיאה מתחילת השדה ובאמצע ובסוף. ואם נתן בין בתחילה בין באמצע בין בסוף יצא. רבי שמעון אומר אם נתן בין בתחילה בין באמצע בין בסוף הרי זו פיאה וצריך שיתן בסוף כשיעור. רבי יהודה אומר אם שייר קלח אחד סומך לו משום פיאה ואם לאו אין נותן אלא משום הפקר. אמר רבי יהודה במה דברים אמורים? בזמן שנתן פיאה ומבקש להוסיף.

Notes:

1. Mishna Peah 1:3 mentions an argument between the Tanna Kama, Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah about which parts of the field qualify as Peah. This Tosefta mentions the same argument with some additional clarifications.
2. The Tosefta says explicitly that when it says beginning, middle and end it is referring to the locations of produce inside the field. However the Beraita in the Sifra (Kedoshim 1) says the same law as our Tosefta without the word “field” in it. Based on the text in the Sifra, Saul Lieberman in his commentary Tosefta Kepshuta (on this Tosefta), claims that some Rishonim (medieval authorities) explain that it is referring to the time of the harvest (i.e. beginning of the harvest, middle of the harvest and end of the harvest) and not to the physical location of the produce in the field. See Rashi (Shabbat 23a, Lesof Sadehu) and Rabeinu Hillel (Sifra, Kedoshim 1, Daf 40a, Veein Peah Ela Lebesof). However it seems to me that that is not the intent of these Rishonim, but rather they learn the Sifra in the same manner as this Tosefta as I will explain further. From the Tosefta it is clear that that is not the meaning of this law and that it is referring to the location of the left produce in the field, because the Tosefta says the word “field”. In fact, most other Rishonim learn it to mean exactly that. See Rambam and Rash Mishantz on Mishna Peah 1:3. According to this explanation it is a little difficult to understand what is meant by “the beginning of the field”, since fields do not really have a beginning and an end, but rather the center and the edges. Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:3, Daf 6a) implies that these three locations are relative to where the person began harvesting his field and they do not refer to constant points in the field. So the beginning of the field means the place in the field where the person began harvesting the crops, the middle of the field refers to the spot where he has harvested half of the crops and the other half still remains, and the end of the field refers to the spot where the last of the crops have remained after the rest of the field has been already harvested. This explanation is preferred by Rash Sirillio in his commentary on the Yerushalmi. The Ralbag in his commentary on the Torah (Vayikra 19:9) explains this logic of the Yerushalmi as follows. He says that the Torah does not care where the person started and ended harvesting his field. He could have started harvesting it from a corner in a spiral circle and the last patch of produce that remained from the harvest ended up smack in the center of the field, which is the location of the field which is most difficult to access. Still the Torah prefers this last remaining produce to be Peah despite the difficulty of access to it. The Torah does not care how hard it is for the poor people to get to the left produce as long as they can get to it. All the Torah is concerned with is that the farmer leaves the last of his produce for the poor. The Torah did not want the farmer to feel that his top priority is taking care of the poor and not of himself; therefore he is only required to leave the last of his harvested produce and not the first of it. In fact Tosefta 1:7 points out four reasons why the Torah preferred that Peah should be left in end of the harvest path. Physical accessibility to the produce is not one of those reasons. Therefore Rashi and Rabeinu Hillel that are mentioned by Lieberman mention the beginning of the harvest not because they were talking about the time of the harvest season, but rather the location of the produce in the field where the farmer began harvesting it.
3. This first statement of the Tosefta teaches us that a person can give Peah in the same field in many different locations simultaneously. He can leave some Peah in the beginning of the field, where he began harvesting, then leave some more in the middle, after he harvested half of the field, and the leave some more in the end where he finished harvesting the field.
4. The second statement of the Tosefta clarifies that even if the person left Peah only in one location in the field he has fulfilled his obligation of giving Peah regardless where that locations happens to be and he does not have to give any additional produce in the end of the field. The Tanna Kama (the first anonymous opinion) holds that not only by Rabbinical law, but even by Torah law there is no specific location in the field where the person must leave Peah. Therefore regardless where he left Peah he has fulfilled his obligation both according to the Torah and according to the Rabbis.
5. See above Tosefta 1:1, note 8. Rebbi Shimon holds that the whole amount required by the Rabbis – 1/60^th of the produce of that field must be located in the end of the field and not in some other location.
6. Rebbi Shimon argues on the Tanna Kama and says that both by Torah law and by Rabbinical law he must give Peah in the end of the field (i.e. where he finished harvesting) and if he did not do so he did not fulfill the obligation of giving Peah. Therefore the whole amount required by the Rabbis must be located in the end of the field. However the person is allowed to add to the basic amount of Peah required by the Rabbis (1/60^th) additional crops. These additional crops can be located anywhere in the field, even in the beginning or in the middle relative to where he began harvesting, and they are considered to be Peah, as opposed to just Hefker – ownerless produce. The difference is that Peah can only be collected by the poor, where as ownerless produce can be taken by anyone, even the rich.
7. Rebbi Yehudah’s opinion is in between the Tanna Kama’s and Rebbi Shimon’s. Rebbi Yehudah holds that by Torah law the person must leave Peah in the end of the field (i.e. where he finished harvesting), however that applies only to the minimum amount required by the Torah, which is a single stock. The rest of it up to 1/60^th is only required Rabbinically and the Rabbis did not require Peah to be left in the end of the field, but rather anywhere in the field. Therefore as long as the farmer left one stock in the end of the field he has fulfilled the Torah obligation and now he can leave the rest of it up to 1/60^th in any location. However if he did not leave anything in the end of the field then he did not fulfill his Torah obligation of giving Peah and it is impossible to fulfill the Rabbinical obligation without fulfilling the Torah obligation first. Therefore none of the produce left counts as Peah, but rather as ownerless produce, which can be taken by either poor or rich. Obviously if the person wants to leave additional produce beyond 1/60^th for Peah he can do so and it will also be considered to be Peah and not just ownerless produce, but only as long as the minimum requirements of Torah and Rabbinical law have been fulfilled.
8. It should be noted that there are other explanations of the argument between the Tanna Kama, Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah. For example, see the commentary of Rash Mishantz on the Mishna (Mishna Peah 1:3). I have explained their argument in a way which fits best into the language of the Tosefta.

Tractate Peah, Chapter 1 Tosefta 41 A good thought is smelted2 by God into an action (i.e. God makes sure to turn it into an action). A bad thought is not smelted by God into an action (i.e. God makes sure that it does not become an action), as it is said, “Had I considered iniquity in my heart, the Lord would not have listened.” (Tehillim 66:18)3 If so how is it true [when it says the following:] “Hear Earth, I bring evil to this nation, the fruit of their thoughts …”? (Yirmiyahu 6:19)4 But rather, [it should be stated as follows:] a good thought is combined by God with an action (i.e. God counts it as if it was done, even though it was not) and not a good [thought] is not combined by God with an action (i.e. God does not count it as if it was done).5

מסכת פאה פרק א תוספתא ד מחשבה טובה המקום מצרפה למעשה, מחשבה רעה אין המקום מצרפה למעשה שנאמר (תהלים סו:יח) אָוֶן, אִם רָאִיתִי בְלִבִּי, לֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲדֹנָי. ומה אני מקיים (ירמיהו ו:יט) שִׁמְעִי הָאָרֶץ, הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי מֵבִיא רָעָה אֶל הָעָם הַזֶּה, פְּרִי מַחְשְׁבוֹתָם? אלא מחשבה טובה המקום מצרפה עם המעשה ושאינה טובה אין המקום מצרפה למעשה.

Notes:

1. The Tosefta continues on a similar subject as the previous Tosefta. It is not related to any Mishna.
2. The Hebrew word צרף has two different meanings. It can mean to “smelt metal” or it can mean to “combine”. In the original statement of the Tosefta it makes more sense to translate it to smelt, because the Tosefta means to say that even though the person only had a thought God will make sure that it will become a real deed in the future. However in the final statement of the Tosefta not only changed the intent of the statement, but also the meaning of the word, which now means to combine, meaning that God counts a thought is if it was an action, even though in reality it was never implemented.
3. The verse in Tehillim is taken literally in this case, that if King David would have thought to do something evil God would not have listened to his plea.
4. The verse in Yirmiyahu is taken somewhat out of context since in the end of the verse which is omitted in the Tosefta God specifically addresses the Jewish people who He says performed evil deeds. However the Tosefta interprets this verse to be talking about people’s thoughts in general and about a particular people. It seems to me that the Tosefta’s question is really a philosophical question and this verse is simply brought as an Asmachta (reference). The question that bothers the Tosefta is that from the initial statement it would seem that whenever people have evil thoughts those thoughts should never become a reality, because God would make sure that it does not happen. However in the real world we see that people commit evil deeds all the time and clearly God does not prevent them from doing so, in which case the Tosefta’s original statement is simply not true.
5. Due to this philosophical problem the Tosefta changes its statement. Now it means to say that when a person has a good thought even if the person has never implemented it into a good deed God counts it as if he did and will reward the person accordingly. However if a person had an evil thought, but he never implemented it into an evil deed, then God simply ignores it and does not punish him for it. Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:1, Daf 5a) interprets the Tosefta’s final intent in this manner. The wording of the Tosefta’s last statement that I have quoted above is from the Erfurt manuscript. However in the Vienna manuscript it is different. There the Tosefta says as following:
   

   But rather, [it should be stated as follows:] a thought that has fruit is combined by God with an action and a [thought] that does not have fruit is not combined by God with an action.

   אלא מחשבה שעושה פירות המקום מצרפה עם המעשה מחשבה שאינה עושה פירות אין המקום מצרפה עם המעשה

   Talmud Bavli (Kiddushin 40a) quotes this Tosefta, and although in the printed version of the Gemara the text reads as in the Erfurt manuscript, the Munchen manuscript of Talmud Bavli and  Rashi (Kiddushin 40a, Machshava Sheosah Peirot, Metzarfah Lemaaseh) have the same reading in the Gemara as in the Vienna manuscript of this Tosefta. Rashi interprets it to mean that if a person took his thought and implemented it into a deed then God counts the thought on the same level as the deed and therefore if the thought and the deed were good then the person gets double the reward and if the thought and the deed were evil then the person gets double the punishment. However if the person never implemented his thought into a deed then God does not reward him at all if it was good and does not punish him at all if it was evil. I personally prefer the reading in the Tosefta according to the Erfurt manuscript since it flows better in the context from the Tosefta’s original statement.

Tractate Peah, Chapter 1 Tosefta 31 A merit (i.e. a good deed) has principal (i.e. immediate benefit) and it has fruit (i.e. future benefit to the person who performed it),2 as it is said, “They say about the righteous man that it is good for him, that they will eat the fruit of their deeds.” (Yeshayahu 3:10)3 A transgression has principal (i.e. immediate damage to the person who committed it), but does not have fruit (i.e. future damage),4 as it is said, “Woe to the wicked man, it is bad for him. The product of his hands will be done to him.” (Yeshayahu 3:11)5 If so how is it true [when it says the following:] “And they will eat the fruit of their ways and will be full of their own schemes?” (Mishlei 1:31)6 [But rather,] a transgression that makes fruit (i.e. bad consequences in the future) has fruit (i.e. causes future damage to the person), [but a transgression] that does not make fruit (i.e. bad consequences in the future) does not have fruit (i.e. future damage to the person who committed it).7

מסכת פאה פרק א תוספתא ג זכות יש לה קרן ויש לה פירות שנאמר (ישעיהו ג:י) אִמְרוּ צַדִּיק, כִּי-טוֹב: כִּי-פְרִי מַעַלְלֵיהֶם, יֹאכֵלוּ. עבירה יש לה קרן ואין לה פירות שנאמר (ישעיהו ג:יא) אוֹי, לְרָשָׁע רָע: כִּי-גְמוּל יָדָיו, יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ. אם כן מה אני מקיים (משלי א:לא) וְיֹאכְלוּ, מִפְּרִי דַרְכָּם; וּמִמֹּעֲצֹתֵיהֶם יִשְׂבָּעוּ? עבירה שעושה פירות יש לה פירות, שאין עושה פירות אין לה פירות.

Notes:

1. The Tosefta continues on a similar subject as the previous Tosefta. It is not related to any Mishna.
2. Most commentators on the Tosefta think that fruit and principal are references to this world and the Afterlife. However they argue which one refers to which, because it is not clear from the context. For various opinions see Tosefta Kepshuta and Higayon Aryeh. However, I have chosen not to explain it that way. I think that it is referring to immediate benefit and future benefit in this world for the person who performed the good deed. If a person helps someone at the least it makes him feel good right away, which is an immediate benefit. And the person whom he helped today may help him in return tomorrow, which would be a future benefit.
3. The verse is taken literally in this case. The verse says that it is good for the righteous in the present tense, referring to immediate befit, and then it says in the future tense that the righteous will eat the fruit of their deeds, referring to future benefit.
4. On a similar note a person who commits a bad act causes damage to himself by committing it. The damage can be emotional that a person feels bad about what he did, or it could be physical that he may be searched for by others for committing his crime. However, as long as he does not get caught, his transgression will not cause him anymore grief in the future in this world. Obviously in the Afterlife God will punish him, but as I already mentioned above in note 2, this Tosefta is not talking about Afterlife.
5. This verse as well is interpreted literally as the previous verse. It says that it is bad for the evil person in the present tense, meaning that he causes immediate damage to himself by performing the transgression. However the second half of the verse seems to be in contradiction with the Tosefta’s explanation. It says that an evil person will reap the product of his hands, meaning that he will get punished in the future (i.e. his evil deed will cause him future damage). However the Tosefta says that a transgression does not have fruit, which is not what the verse implies.
6. The verse in Mishlei clearly says that evil people will reap their own fruit, meaning that they will get future damage. So it is in contradiction with the Tosefta’s previous statement that evil deeds do not have fruit. The question is very puzzling to me, since the previous verse from Yeshayahu said the same thing, although the Tosefta chose to ignore that.
7. The Tosefta resolves the question by clarifying that transgressions that have future consequences cause future damage where is transgressions that do not have future consequences do not cause future damage. A good example of this may be if a man cheated on his wife with another married woman. His act has major future consequences, because it will probably result in divorce, a custody battle over children and possibly a ruination of his mistress’ family as well. However, if a person steals a candy bar from a supermarket, as long as he does not get caught most probably nothing will neither happen to him nor to the supermarket. As I already explained, since the Tosefta is not talking about punishment from God the question of why bad things happen to good people and good things to bad people does not come into play here. All the Tosefta is talking about is natural consequences of a person’s actions.

Tractate Peah, Chapter 1 Tosefta 21 For these [evil] things they2 collect interest3 from the person in this world and the principal (i.e. main punishment) remains for the World to Come: for idol worship, for illicit sexual relations,4 and for murder. And for gossip [the damage and punishment are] equivalent to them all.5

מסכת פאה פרק א תוספתא ב על אילו דברים נפרעין מן אדם בעולם הזה והקרן קיימת לעולם הבא: על עבודה זרה ועל גלוי עריות ועל שפיכות דמים ועל לשון הרע כנגד כולם.

Notes:

1. Mishna Peah 1:1 listed three good things that a person can do in this world for which he receives physical benefit during his lifetime and in addition great reward in the Afterlife. The Mishna added that the reward for learning Torah is equivalent to the other three good things combined. This Tosefta states a similar list, but of evil deeds that a person can do for which cause great damage to his life in this world and will ensure great punishment in the World to Come.
2. “They” in this case does not refer to anyone in particular, not even to God. It is used as “the big they”.
3. The Hebrew word פרע means to collect debts or interest. In this case it means that the person causes damage to his own life by performing these evil deeds and causes his own ruin.
4. Illicit relations refer to any type of forbidden sexual relations, such as incest, bestiality and homosexual intercourse, but most commonly it refers to sleeping with another person’s spouse.
5. Obviously the Tosefta uses the juxtaposition of gossip opposite the three most severe sins in Judaism, in the case of which a person if forced to do them by someone else must chose to be killed instead (see Talmud Bavli Sanhedrin 74a), in order to emphasize the severity of gossip. It does not literally mean that gossip is so evil that a person must chose to be killed if he is forced by another person to speak gossip about someone.